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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
BAILMENT - LIABILITY FOR CONTENTS
OF CLOSED RECEPTACLE
Mickey* v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.'
Plaintiff cashed a check for $589.71 in order to meet a
payroll. He placed the money in a leather brief case and
drove to Defendant's store where he made some purchases,
carrying the brief case with him. Defendant delivered the
purchases, which were bulky, to its loading platform so that
Plaintiff might carry them to his automobile more easily;
while loading his car, Plaintiff inadvertently left his brief
case on the platform. When he called for the brief case the
next day, Plaintiff found that it had been placed in Defen-
dant's "property room" for safekeeping, but that the $589.71
had been removed. Plaintiff sought to recover this sum
from Defendant, as bailee. Judgment on demurrer for
Defendant; Plaintiff appealed. Held, affirming judgment
below, that knowledge or notice is a necessary prerequisite
to a bailment of the contents of a closed receptacle, and
since Plaintiff failed to allege such knowledge on the part of,
or notice to, Defendant as to money contained in the brief
case, the demurrer was properly sustained.
It is well established that the owner of premises where
personal property is mislaid by an invitee has the right to
possession as against everyone except the true owner, and
that Defendant became a gratuitous bailee of the brief case,
once he found it and took it into his possession.' The degree
of care owed by a gratuitous bailee is not well defined; some
jurisdictions hold him liable only for "gross negligence",'
while others, including Maryland, require him to exercise
such care "as persons of ordinary prudence in his situation
and business, usually bestow in the custody and keeping
of like property belonging to themselves".4
Whether a finder of a receptacle becomes bailee of the
contents of which he has no knowledge, is not settled, and
in the absence of authority, for the purposes of this dis-
cussion, we must place the finder in the same position as
'76 A. 2d 350 (Md. 1950).
2 Norris v. Camp, 144 F. 2d 1 (10th Cir. 1944).8 Coggs v. Bernard, 2 L4. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Repr. 107 (1703), is the
leading English case discussing the duty of care of the various classes
of bailees.
I Schermer v. Neurath, 54 Md. 491, 497; 39 Am. Rep. 397 (1880), is a lead-
ing case on the duty of care owed by a gratuitous bailee. The case rejects
the view that the standard is the care taken by a particular bailee of his
own goods (which would favor negligent bailees and penalize those who are
careful) ; instead, the standard of care is that taken by a prudent bailee in
a like situation.
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other bailees of a container who have no knowledge of the
contents. In the Mickey case the Court suggested that if
the nature of the contents of the brief case had been dis-
closed, it might be assumed that Defendant would have
exercised greater care, and that, in the absence of such
knowledge, Defendant was reasonable in assuming that the
brief case contained papers of little or no value to persons
other than the owner, intimating that liability of Defendant
might depend on whether it exercised ordinary care under
the circumstances, and not whether there was a bailment
of the contents. But the Court rejected this view5 and
adopted what it termed the "weight of authority", that
there is no bailment of the contents of which the bailee of
the receptacle has no actual or constructive notice.'
Thus, where a bank accepted from a customer a box for
safekeeping, without knowledge of its contents, it was held
not liable in damages for failure to deliver a will contained
in the box, upon the death of the customer;' and in a
similar case a bank was not liable for loss of money from a
box represented by the bailor to contain "papers and other
valuables".' Where a customer of a parking garage left mer-
chandise in his truck, unknown to the garage, it was held
that he could recover only for the theft of the truck, but
not for the merchandise.9 Again, in an action against a
parking lot for theft of an automobile, recovery was allowed
5 Supra, n. 1, 353.
"The very essence of the relation is possession, and so it may be said,
as a general rule, that there must be an acceptance of the property on the
part of the bailee; for one cannot be made a bailee against his will, and
must have knowledge of the fact that he is in possession of the property,"
VAN ZrLE, BAILMENTS AND CARTlRS (1908, 2nd ed.), Sec. 18. See also
EDWARDS, BAILMENT (1878, 2nd ed.), Sec. 49, that the bailee has the right
to assume that a container holds only those articles reasonably expected to
be found therein under the circumstances, and this "because no bailee can
be drawn by artifice into a responsibility, greater than he intended to
assume." See cases infra, ns. 7, 8, 9, 10. The court in the principal case
also quoted WITLIsTON, CoNTRACTS (1936, rev. ed.), See. 1038A, that "The
general rule is that the bailment of a receptacle does not entail liability for
inclosed articles other than those known to the bailee or ordinarily con-
tained therein, though, of course, the bailee is under a duty of reasonable
care to protect the receptacle in the condition in which it is received." This
would seem to bear out the view that non-disclosure goes to the question
of liability, rather than to creation of the bailment, despite the court's
holding to the contrary.
7 Sawyer v. Old Lowell Nat. Bank, 230 Mass. 342, 119 N. E. 825, 1 A. L. R.
269 (1918).
8 Riggs v. Bank of Camas Prairie, 34 Idaho 176, 200 P. 118, 18 A. L. R.
83 (1921).
9 D. A. Schulte, Inc. v. North Terminal Garage Co., 291 Mass. 251, 197
N. E. 16 (1935). Since there was no bailment of the contents, the court held
that the defendant owed no duty of care toward them, nor would there be
liability for conversion for misdelivery to the thief. See Jones, The Parking
Lot Case8, 27 Georgetown L. R. 162 (198).
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only for those things the defendant knew were in the auto-
mobile, he being a bailee of those things only.10
Maryland has applied a similar rule in the case of inn-
keepers. At common law, the innkeeper was a virtual in-
surer of all property which his guest brought to the inn.
Because of this harsh burden imposed by law, the Court of
Appeals in Pettigrew v. Barnum" held that the innkeeper
was not responsible for articles not generally considered
"baggage", such as silver knives, forks and spoons contained
in a guest's trunk.
"It is not within the implied contract of the landlord,
that he will be responsible for all goods which may be
brought to his house, merely because they happen to
be in a trunk."' 2
Two years later, in Giles v. Fauntlero'y, ' 3 the Court cited
and followed the Pettigrew case, holding that an innkeeper
was not liable for such extraordinary contents of a guest's
trunk as a Colt revolver, silver teaspoons, or surgical in-
struments (unless the guest were a physician or medical
student). Again, in Treiber v. Burrows,4 an innkeeper was
held not liable for $1500 in bank notes and a chest of tea,
which were not reasonably considered "baggage". How-
ever, the Maryland decisions seem to be unique in so re-
stricting the liability of innkeepers. 5 Further, there seems
to be no basis in the innkeeper decisions for the rule invoked
in the Mickey case, that knowledge or notice is a necessary
prerequisite to a bailment of the contents. On the contrary,
non-liability of the innkeeper seems to stem from the fact
'oPalotto v. Hanna Parking Garage Co., 68 N. E. 2d 170, noted 45 Mich.
L. R. 625 (Ohio 1946). See Jones, The Parking Lot Cases, ibid.
1 11 Md. 434, 69 Am. Dec. 212 (1857). Last cited with approval in Roueche
v. Hotel Braddock, 164 Md. 620, 623; 165 Atl. 891 (1933).
'Ibid, 449. That the holding is unique, see infra, n. 15.
13 Md. 126, 139 (1859).
"127 Md. 130 (1867).
15Brown, in his treatise on personal property says: "It has been intimated
that the liability of the innkeeper should attach only to such goods as the
guest brings with him to the inn, in the capacity of a traveler, including his
ordinary luggage, clothing, and the money necessary for traveling expenses.
Only in Maryland, however, does the liability of the innkeeper appear to be
so restricted. The general doctrine extends the innkeeper's special liability
to all property of the guest which the latter brings with him into the hotel."
BROWN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY (1936), Sec. 105.
See also Roueche v. Hotel Braddock, supra, n. 11, that the innkeeper is
bound in law to keep his guest's goods safely, ". . . and this the majority
construe to mean all the goods brought within the inn, originally adopted
in this state (Towson v. Havre de Grace Bank, 6 H. & J. 47), but later
modified here so as to cover only necessary money, baggage, and personal
effects, a modification which 16 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2nd ed.) 539, says is
not supported by authority, in spite of which we still hold it to be law in
this state ..
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that the innkeeper is responsible for his guest's baggage
because he is compensated for that service, and that addi-
tional or unusually valuable articles, disproportionate to
this compensation and not strictly for personal use, should
be excluded."
Also, there is the underlying principle, rejected by the
Court in the instant case, that the innkeeper is not liable
for unusual contents of which he had no knowledge because
if he had known of the contents he would have exercised
greater care and prevented the loss; 17 that is, although the
innkeeper is bailee of such articles, he is only held to ordi-
nary care under the circumstances.
It seems, therefore, that the better view is that a bail-
ment of a receptacle constitutes a bailment of the contents.'"
The cases which hold the bailee not liable for the loss of the
contents when there was no notice can nearly all be ex-
plained on the theory that there was no evidence indicating
" See Treiber v. Burrows, aupra, n. 14, 144, which says: "the ground of
this responsibility is the profit which the ... innkeeper receives for enter-
taining his guest, and its rigor is justified 'on the great principle of public
utility, to which all private considerations ought to yield'." Although the
Maryland cases have relieved the innkeeper at common law, it is interest-
Ing to note that at the time of Pettigrew v. Barnum, supra, n. 11, the Legis-
lature was moved to give statutory relief in what is now Article 71, See. 3,
of the Maryland Code (1939). This statute in effect makes an innkeeper
no longer liable for loss of "money, jewelry, securities and plate" if he
provides an iron safe or other secure depositary for the same. See also
Dibble v. Brown, 12 Ga. 217, 225 (1852), cited in Pettigrew v. Barnum,
supra, n. 11, where a carrier was held not responsible for unusual articles
of baggage; the court, in what was admittedly obiter dictum, discussed
generally the reasons for and against holding the carrier liable.
1uSee Orange County Bank v. Brown, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 85 (1832), cited in
Pettigrew v. Barnum, supra, n. 11, where a carrier was held not liable for
$11,250 contained in a travelling trunk, which was considered not included
under the term "baggage". The court failed to cite lack of knowledge by
the carrier as precluding a bailment, but in effect approved a ruling by the
lower court that "common justice required that he (carrier) should be in-
formed of the nature of his charge, so that he might take the necessary
precautions for the safety of the bills and for his own protection." Another
ground cited was the injustice in holding a carrier liable for concealed
contents having a value far out of proportion to the compensation for
the service.
ISee 6 Amer. Jur. Bailment, (Rev. 1950), Sec. 71, et seq., to the effect
that there is no settled rule whether delivery and acceptance of a closed
receptacle is sufficient to create a bailment of the contents, but:
"According to the larger number of the more recent decisions, and on
principle, where one person accepts from another a sealed or locked
receptacle which is delivered to him for safekeeping, carriage, or other
purpose for which a bailment may be made, neither in the contempla-
tion of the parties nor of necessity involving control by the bailee over
the subject matter other than in bulk, or any use of it by him, the
transaction should be regarded as a bailment of the contents as well as
of the receptacle. Certainly no authority is needed to demonstrate that
the purpose moving the parties in such a transaction is concerned with
the contents rather than with the receptacle, and the bailment of the
latter is generally only incidental." (Sec. 72).
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any lack of due care on the part of the bailee.19 This would
seem to be sounder reasoning than to deny the existence of
a bailment. The same criticism obtains in the principal
case. Taken at face value, the decision appears to negative
liability of Defendant for the value of even such contents
as are reasonably to be expected in a brief case merely
because it did not have knowledge or notice of the same.
There seems no doubt, however, that the Court would
charge a bailee in a proper case with constructive notice of
certain contents of a receptacle, just as innkeepers are
charged with ordinary "baggage". Applying the theory of
the instant case, the Defendant would escape liability for
loss of the money no matter how negligent it might have
been, since if there is no bailment there is no basis for
imposing liability for the loss. As there was no allegation
that Defendant failed to exercise ordinary care, the Court
might have based its decision on that point without laying
down the more questionable doctrine that a bailment did
not exist. A better rule in such cases would seem to be that
there is in fact a bailment of unusual or concealed contents
of a receptacle, but that a bailee need exercise only ordinary
care under the circumstances; and whether this standard
has been met should be determined from all the factors in
the transaction, including the relationship between the
bailor and bailee, the business of the bailee, the nature of
the contents, the nature of the receptacle, as well as how
the loss occurred.2" Thus, whether a bailee should be held
liable would in effect depend on whether he acted reason-
ably under the circumstances, as opposed to the inflexible
rule of non-liability laid down in the principal case.
19 That the view that no bailment is created where the bailor fails to dis-
close the nature of the contents to the bailee goes to the question of liability
of the bailee rather than to the existence of the bailment, see 45 Mich. L.
Rev. 625, 626 (1947), noting Palotto v. Hanna Parking Garage Co., supra,
n. 10, stating that "the result reached in the principal case can be justified
by placing a duty upon the defendant bailee to exercise reasonable care
under the circumstances. His lack of knowledge that the items were present
in the car would be enough to show that he could not take precautions to
protect an unknown chattel." See also BRowN, op. cit. supra, n. 15, 237, Sec.
75, saying that "the result of these cases (Sawyer v. Old Lowell Nat. Bank,
supra, n. 7; Riggs v. Bank of Camas Praire, supra, n. 8) seems correct for
there is an inequity in requiring the bailee to be responsible for valuable
articles, the existence of which he has no reason to suspect. It is difficult
to understand, however, how it can be said there is no bailment. If the
depositary is not in possession of the concealed goods, who else Is? By
possession of the receptacle the bailee must be held to have possession of
the contents."
21 See Wurmser, Inc. v. Interstate Hotel Co., 148 Neb. 660, 28 N. W. 2d 405
(1947), cited in Mickey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra, n. 1; where failure
of the bailor to notify the bailee of unusual contents of a sample case was
held to be contributory negligence barring the plaintiff bailor from recovery.
The sample case contained over $187,000 worth of precious stones.
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